Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a …scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive …scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive …scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.
Introduction
Governments are confronted routinely with important policy decisions, not least with decisions regarding spending and taxation (i.e., …scal policy) and about how to set a policy interest rate (i.e., monetary policy). Following Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is now well-known that, when private agents are forward-looking and rational, optimal policies are (invariably) not timeconsistent and that time-consistent policies are (invariably) not optimal. Absent a commitment technology, attention focuses naturally on policies that are time-consistent or, more speci…cally, on equilibria that are Markov-perfect and this focus has led to a large literature on "discretionary" policymaking. While there are notable exceptions, the vast bulk of this literature computes equilibrium using what is essentially linear-quadratic dynamic programming with the policy problem approximated to have the required linear constraints and quadratic objective.
Although some policy problems can conceivably be well-approximated by linear constraints and second-order accurate welfare approximations, such as policy problems for which the steady state is e¢ cient, and for other problems, such as those where the model has many state variables, only linear-quadratic methods may be feasible, for many interesting problems, such as problems involving distortionary taxes and/or imperfect competition, …rst-order accuracy cannot be obtained through linear-quadratic methods. Moreover, some model characteristics, like occasionally binding constraints, call out for nonlinear solution methods even when the policy objective is quadratic (Adam and Billi, 2007; Nakata, 2012) . Fortunately, it is becoming increasingly feasible to analyze discretionary policymaking without turning to the linear-quadratic toolkit.
In this paper we present and compare three strategies for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in nonlinear stochastic business cycle models. These strategies apply to economies populated by a large number of atomistic private agents and by a benevolent government, tasked with conducting policy in order to maximize the welfare of the representative household. The solution strategies include value function iteration, policy function iteration on generalized Euler equations, and parameterized shadow prices. To illustrate the three strategies we apply them to the canonical dynamic model of …scal policy taken from Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), augmented to include an transitory aggregate technology shock and extended to allow for capital depreciation (as per Ambler and Pelgrin, 2010) . In this model, government spending provides households with utility and the …scal authority's problem is to choose government spending optimally, subject to a balanced-budget constraint, while lacking both a commitment technology and the ability to impose lump-sum taxes. This balanced-budget …scal policy model provides the ideal environment in which to illustrate the methods because this model, or closely related models, have been studied by Stockman (2001) , Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) , Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) , Ortigueira (2006) , Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008) , and Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) . However, with the exception of Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) , each of these studies has looked only at deterministic speci…cations and/or focused only on the model's steady state behavior. 1 For the canonical …scal policy model we …nd that value function iteration and the generalized Euler equations solution method, both employing Chebyshev polynomials for function approximation and Gauss-Hermite quadrature for integration, perform well and are notably more accurate in terms of Euler-equation errors than the parameterized shadow prices solution approach, which is based on parameterized expectations and uses Monte Carlo integration. We extend the canonical model to allow for a risk-sensitive …scal authority and for an inequality constraint on government spending as a share of output and show how the equilibrium of these models can be computed easily, and relatively accurately, using the value function iteration solution method. We show that the risk-sensitive …scal authority cuts government spending in order to reduce income taxation and thereby mitigate the disincentive on household capital accumulation.
Our paper is related to several others. In particular, we take our main model-a balancedbudget …scal policy problem-from Ambler and Pelgrin (2010), who show how a method of parameterized expectations can be used to compute its time-consistent equilibrium. Our use of Chebyshev polynomials for approximating functions is shared by a number of studies, including Ortigueira (2006) , Sorger (2008, 2009 ), Ortigueira, Pereira, and Pichler (2012), and Anderson, Kim, and Yun (2010). Our paper is also related to the important literature on discretionary policymaking in linear-quadratic models, and to the computational strategies of Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Oudiz and Sachs (1985) , Levine (1985, 1993 ), Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986), Söderlind (1999) , and Dennis (2007) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple balancedbudget business cycle model of …scal policy. This model is interesting in its own right and usefully serves as a vehicle for illustrating and comparing the various solution strategies. Section 3 presents the three solution strategies. Section 4 applies the various solution strategies to solve the …scal policy model for its Markov-perfect equilibrium. Section 5 shows how features such as occasionally binding constraints and risk-sensitivity can be accommodated. Section 6 discusses computation times and the application of these methods to larger models. Section 7 o¤ers concluding remarks.
The model
We consider a production economy populated by a unit-mass of identical atomistic households, a unit-mass of identical atomistic …rms, and a …scal authority. Firms rent capital and hire labor from households and use these inputs to produce goods that are sold to households and the …scal authority. Goods sold to the …scal authority are transformed costlessly into a government consumption good while those sold to households are either consumed or used to augment the capital stock. The …scal authority taxes household income, using the revenue to …nance the provision of the government consumption good. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
This model follows Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and extends Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008).
Households
Households own the capital stock. They receive income by renting their capital and supplying their labor to …rms at prices r t and w t , respectively. After paying income tax, households use their remaining income to purchase goods, which they use to o¤set capital-depreciation, to invest in their capital stock, and to consume. The representative household's lifetime utility function is described by
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, c t denotes private consumption, G t denotes government consumption goods, and the momentary utility function u (c t ; G t ) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and to satisfy the Inada (1963) conditions. The capital owned by the representative household evolves over time according to
where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate, t > 0 is the tax rate applied to household income (with a tax-allowance for capital-depreciation), and k t is the household's stock of capital as of the beginning of period t. Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, (1), subject to their ‡ow-budget constraint, (2), taking prices, taxes, and government consumption goods as given.
Firms
Our stand-in aggregate …rm employs capital and labor to produce output according to the neoclassical production technology
where Y t represents aggregate output, K t denotes the aggregate capital stock as of the beginning of period t, and z t is an aggregate technology shock that obeys the stochastic process
where 2 (0; 1) and t i:i:d: 0; 2 .
Markets for capital and labor are perfectly competitive and clear at the prices
respectively, with the stand-in …rm making zero-pro…ts in equilibrium.
Fiscal authority
The …scal authority cannot impose lump-sum taxes, but receives revenue by taxing household income at marginal rate t . These tax revenues are used to purchase goods that are costlessly transformed into government consumption goods and provided to households at zero unit-cost.
The …scal authority has no outstanding liabilities and cannot issue bonds. As a consequence, the …scal authority's decisions about taxation and the provision of the public good, decisions made to maximize the welfare of the representative household, are constrained by the balanced-budget
where G t denotes aggregate government consumption.
Information, timing, and aggregation
With the current realization for the aggregate technology given by z t , we denote the history of realizations for aggregate technology up to and including period t by z t = fz i g t i=0 . Similarly, using x t = z t k t K t 0 to denote the economy's state at the beginning of period t, we assume that at the beginning of period t all agents are endowed with the information set given by the history x t . After entering period t, and having observed x t , the …scal authority, …rms, and households make their decisions simultaneously. This timing protocol is also considered by Cohen and Michel (1988) , Ortigueira (2006) , and Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and is relatively common in the literature on optimal …scal policy. 2 Our assumptions that all households and all …rms are identical and that they are of unit-mass implies that K t = k t and C t = c t in aggregate.
Solving for Markov-perfect optimal policy
In this section we present three ways to solve this …scal-policy model for a Markov-perfect equilibrium. More generally, however, this model is quite representative of the …scal-and monetarypolicy problems that we are interested in, and the solution methods presented here can be applied quite broadly to these problems. As we shall see, the value function iteration method that we describe can also be applied with relative ease to more sophisticated policy problems, ones involving features such as Epstein-Zin preferences, risk-sensitive preferences, and/or occasionally binding constraints.
Value function iteration
The problem facing the representative household can be represented by the Bellman equation
with the constraints given by the laws-of-motion for household-level and aggregate capital, respectively,
taking G t and C t as given, and with the initial conditions z t > 0 and k t = K t > 0, known. Notice that (5) and (6) have been used so that (9) does not contain prices. Combining the …rst-order condition with respect to consumption, c t , and the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) condition, and aggregating across identical households gives the consumption-Euler equation
The …scal authority's problem is described by the Bellman equation
with the constraints given by (10) with the initial conditions z t > 0 and K t > 0, known.
Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for this model is a collection of household decision rules,
and a collection of value functions, fv(z t ; k t ; K t ); V (z t ; K t )g, such that
1. The collection fv(z t ; k t ; K t ); c(z t ; k t ; K t ); k(z t ; k t ; K t )g solves the household's decision problem described by the Bellman equation, (8) , and the constraints, (9) and (10).
2. The collection fV (z t ; K t ); C(z t ; K t ); K(z t ; K t ); G(z t ; K t )g solves the …scal authority's decision problem described by the Bellman equation, (12) , and the constraint, (10).
As we describe later, to solve numerically the …scal authority's problem we conjecture functions for aggregate consumption, C (z t ; K t ), aggregate government spending, G (z t ; K t ), and the value function, V (z t ; K t ). Based on these conjectured functions and the law-of-motion for aggregate capital, we solve the …scal authority's problem using a hill-climber, obtaining updates for G (z t ; K t ) and V (z t ; K t ), the former of which, when combined with (11) delivers an update for C (z t ; K t ). Iterating to convergence we arrive at a Markov perfect equilibrium for this policy problem.
Generalized Euler equations
To solve the model for a Markov-perfect equilibrium using generalized Euler equations, we return to the …scal authority's decision problem, which is described by the Bellman equation
and the constraint
The …rst-order condition with respect to G t gives
while the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition yields
; (16) and together (15) and (16) imply the generalized Euler equation
which is "generalized" because it contains both the level and the derivative of C (z t+1 ; K t+1 ).
To solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium one needs to solve the system consisting of (14), (17) , and (11) from the household's problem, with the process for the aggregate technology shock given by (4) . To solve this system we conjecture functions for aggregate consumption, C (z t ; K t ), aggregate government spending, G (z t ; K t ), and iterate on the system until a …xed-point is reached.
Parameterized shadow prices
To solve the model for a time-consistent equilibrium using parameterized shadow prices (Ambler and Pelgrin, 2010), we formulate the household's problem in terms of a Lagrangian
and derive the …rst-order conditions with respect to c t , k t+1 , and t , which after aggregating across identical households (implying t = t ) are, respectively,
Now recognizing that the shadow price t will be a function of only z t and K t in a simultaneousmove time-consistent equilibrium, the …scal authority's problem is formulated using the La-
The …rst-order conditions from the …scal authority's decision problem yield
The time-consistent equilibrium is now obtained by solving (23)- (27) , and (4) using parameterized expectations (Marcet and Lorenzoni, 1999) , to approximate the expectation terms in (25) and (26) .
Solving the model
In this section we solve the model presented in Section 2 using the three methods discussed in Section 3. For this exercise, we assume that the representative household's momentary utility function is of the additively separable form
where f ; ; g > 0, and that the production function is
where 2 (0; 1).
Our parameterization of the model follows Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and is summarized in To compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium using value function iteration (VFI) and generalized Euler equations (GEE) we use Chebyshev polynomials to approximate the conjectured functions. In the case of GEE, the procedure requires introducing polynomials to approximate the decision rules for consumption, C (z t ; K t ), and government spending, G (z t ; K t ), while VFI requires, in addition, a polynomial to approximate the value function, V (z t ; K t ). For a generic function, X (z t ; K t ), these polynomial approximations take the form
where i (K t ) represents the i'th term of the Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate capital, j (z t )
represents the j'th term of the Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate technology, n k and n z represent the orders of the Chebyshev polynomials, and w ij represents the Chebyshev weights.
For VFI, at each node for capital and technology we use a Newton-based hill climber to solve
subject to 4
computing conditional expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. This maximization yields the policy rule for government spending, G (z t ; K t ), and the associated value function, V (z t ; K t ).
From G (z t ; K t ) and C (z t ; K t ; G t ) we compute C (z t ; K t ). For GEE, at each node for capital and technology we use direct iteration over (14), (17) , and (11) 
. To solve the model under its benchmark parameterization we set n z = 6 and n k = 9, and use 50 Chebyshev nodes for the capital stock and 21 Chebyshev nodes for aggregate technology. For the quadrature step, 21
Gauss-Hermite nodes were used.
For the parameterized shadow prices (PSP) method we parameterized the shadow prices according to 5
and performed Monte Carlo integration using 1; 000; 000 simulated observations.
To evaluate the accuracy of each solution we computed the Euler-equation errors (Judd, 1992 )
employing uniform grids for capital and technology over their intervals and using 1000 grid-points in each dimension. For the PSP method, the approximated shadow prices that we obtained were e (z t ; K t ) = e (0:923 0:495 ln(Kt) 0:473zt) ; (36) e (z t ; K t ) = e (1:085 0:544 ln(Kt) 0:457zt) ;
Results comparison
which are very similar to the …rst-order solution presented in Ambler and Pelgrin (2010, Table   2 ). 6 Comparing the solutions shown in Table 2 , it is clear that the three procedures produce very similar results, at least in terms of the model's stochastic steady state. To the extent that there are di¤erences, however, it is the PSP method whose results di¤er, which is consistent with the PSP method being generally less accurate and having larger Euler-equation errors. 7 It should be emphasized, however, that the di¤erences among the three solutions are minor, a …nding that carries over to the unconditional densities shown in Figure 1 . Indeed, looking at Figure   1 , although PSP produces Euler-equation errors (panel C) that are somewhat larger than either VFI or GEE, because these errors are not particularly systematic (such as being mostly of the same sign) they largely wash-out when computing the unconditional densities (panels D-I). To the extent that di¤erences between PSP and the other two methods are apparent, they reside chie ‡y in the decision rule for government spending (panel B), where it is apparent that PSP tends to understate government spending when capital is large. 8 Figure 1 : Comparing solutions
The numerical accuracy of the PSP approach
We saw in Figure 1 that the PSP solution method obtained using parameterized expectations was less accurate in terms of Euler equation errors that either GEE or VFI. To explore the reason for this decline in accuracy, we compute an alternative PSP solution (PSP-alt) in which the approximating function is a Chebyshev polynomial and expectations are computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature rather than Monte Carlo integration. For PSP-alt, therefore, we replace (33) and (34) (which follows Ambler and Pelgrin, 2010) . This implies, therefore, that the decline in numerical accuracy associated with PSP stems less from the choice of approximating function or from the method of integration, and more on the object being approximated. Speci…cally, comparing PSPalt with GEE the essential di¤erence is that GEE approximates the decision rules for consumption and government spending whereas PSP-alt approximates convolutions of these decision rules as part of a more general function.
More sophisticated policy-problems
In this section we consider two policy problems that are more sophisticated than the benchmark model considered above. The …rst of these policy problems introduces a constraint on government spending (as a share of output), a constraint that is occasionally binding in that it binds in some regions of the state-space, but not in others. In many respects, this occasionally binding constraint is not unlike those that appear in monetary policy models with a zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate or in models with occasionally binding collateral constraints. The second of these policy problems assumes that the …scal authority is a risk-sensitive decisionmaker.
We consider these two variations on the benchmark model because they each pose problems for GEE and PSP-particularly risk-sensitivity-but can be accommodated easily through VFI. In particular, although models containing inequality constraints like that described in section 5.1 can be solved using the PSP and GEE solution methods, using the techniques described in Christiano and Fisher (2000), for example, these techniques are somewhat more di¤cult to implement than simply imposing box-constraints within a hill-climber, which is all that is required for VFI. In regard to models with risk-sensitive preferences, …rst-order methods such as GEE and PSP are generally inappropriate for such problems precisely because they do not retain the level of the value function.
Constraints on government spending or taxes
Using VFI it is straightforward to impose inequality constraints on government spending by employing a constrained hill-climber when optimizing the …scal authority's value function with respect to G t . Accordingly, if one wants to constrain government spending as a share of output, such as
where h > l > 0, then one simply determines the upper and lower bound on G t for each node in the state space and determines G (z t ; K t ) and V (z t ; K t ) using constrained optimization.
Inequality constraints on the tax rate can be similarly accommodated. For example, to constrain t to reside in the interval t 2 [ l ; h ], we translate this inequality constraint on the tax rate into one on government spending, as per
and then, as before, maximize the value function at each node in the state space using a constrained hill-climber.
For illustrative purposes, the model that we consider is one in which government spending is constrained to be no less than 16:5 percent of output, with this percent chosen so that the spending constraint would bind occasionally, but not predominantly. We refer to this model as the …scally constrained model.
Risk-sensitive preferences
VFI can also be used to solve decision problems in which the policymaker has risk-sensitive preferences, perhaps motivated by ambiguity aversion or by an aversion to model uncertainty (Hansen and Sargent, 2008) . In place of (12), a risk-sensitive …scal authority will conduct …scal policy based on the Bellman equation
where < 0 is the risk-sensitivity parameter and the constraint continues to be given by (10) . An application of L'Hôpitals'rule establishes that (12) is restored in the limit as " 0 while the e¤ects of < 0 are to distort the continuation value in the Bellman equation, a distortion arising from the …scal authority's aversion to risky life-time utility. Because the value function is an object that VFI retains and delivers, risk-sensitive preferences are straightforward to analyze. To illustrate this point, and to examine the e¤ects that risk-sensitive preferences have on Markov-perfect …scal policy, we consider a decision problem for which the …scal authority's Bellman equation is described by (40) with = 1:0. We refer to this model as the risk-sensitive preferences model.
First-best
As a baseline against which to contrast the Markov-perfect equilibria obtained from the benchmark model, the …scally constrained model, and the risk-sensitive preferences model, we also solve for the …rst-best equilibrium in the benchmark model. To compute this …rst-best equilibrium we formulate the decision problem for the …scal authority in terms of the Bellman equation
with the constraint given by (10) and with technology evolving according to (4) . Although there are two choice variables, this is a standard dynamic programming problem and can be solved using the VFI strategy described above. For the benchmark model, the …rst-best equilibrium must satisfy the resource constraint
and the …rst-order conditions
We use (43) to construct the Euler-equation errors in our accuracy test, which, because it is not imposed in obtaining the solution, leads to a relatively stringent test of accuracy.
Results
In this section we solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the benchmark model, the …scally constrained model, and the risk-sensitive preferences model. We contrast these equilibria with the …rst-best equilibrium obtained from the benchmark model. Table 3 and Figure 2 contain a summary of the main results. The "deterministic" steady state results shown in Table 3 correspond to the steady state in a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a deterministic version of the benchmark model. However, because risk-sensitivity generates no risk-adjustment when the model is deterministic and because the government spending constraint that we impose in the …scally constrained model does not bind at the deterministic steady state, the deterministic steady state values reported apply equally to the …scally constrained model and to the risk-sensitive preferences model. all higher in the benchmark model than they are in its deterministic counterpart.
The constraint that government spending as a share of output be no smaller than 0:165 has little e¤ect on the model's stochastic steady state, which is very similar to that of the benchmark model, but it does lead to a decline in numerical accuracy. Nonetheless, with the log 10 of the max- authority also imposes a smaller income tax rate, reducing some of the disincentive households's face to accumulate capital. As a consequence, the (stochastic) steady state for capital in the risk-sensitive preferences model is almost 8:8, somewhat higher than in the benchmark model. Table 3 also presents summary statistics for the …rst-best equilibrium, quantifying the e¤ects of distortionary taxation and the time-inconsistency problem that these distortions produce.
Figure 3: Solution and accuracy
Where Table 3 presents information about steady state outcomes, Figure 3 presents the consumption function, the government spending function, the densities of the key model-variables, and additional information about numerical accuracy. As earlier, we construct the densities by simulating data from each solution, we report the decision rules for consumption and government spending holding z t = 0, and we use (35) In response to a negative technology shock, Figure 5 reveals some asymmetries relative to the responses to a positive shock shown in Figure 4 . In particular, unlike a positive technology shock, the constraint on government spending does not bind following a negative technology shock and there are greater di¤erences between the …rst-best equilibrium and the benchmark model. Other than for the …scally constrained economy, for which there is a clear asymmetry in the government spending response, the models'responses are relatively symmetric Figure 5 : Responses to a negative 1 s.d. technology shock
To better identify asymmetries in the impulse response functions we plot in Figure 6 the sum of the responses to the positive and negative shock for each variable. To the extent that each model is asymmetric the sum of the responses di¤ers from zero. Looking at Figure 6 (panel E) we see a notable asymmetry in the capital stock's reponses to technology shocks, with this asymmetry propagated through capital role as a state variable into the remaining variables. In addition to this asymmetry, Figure 5 also reveals the asymmetries present in the …scally constrained economy and shows how the occasionally binding constraint on government spending induces asymmetric behavior in consumption and investment. Figure 6 : Impulse response asymmetries
Discussion
The models solved above are relatively small in that they contain only one endogenous state variable and one shock. With only two state variables and the need to integrate over a single shock these models can be solved relatively quickly by all three methods, although with varying accuracy. Excluding coding time, which is an important consideration, GEE and PSP-alt were the quickest, followed by VFI and then PSP. 9 However, each of these methods su¤ers from the curse of dimensionality. As a consequence, solving larger models, ones containing a handful of state variables or more, can be very time-consuming. For such models, it may be advantageous to employ complete polynomials rather than tensor-product polynomials or to use sparse-grid methods (Smolyak, 1963) , as described in Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011), for example, or monomial-methods (Pichler, 2011).
Conclusion
This paper has presented and compared three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in nonlinear business cycle models. Of these methods, two were based on Euler equations while the third was based on value function iteration. We illustrated these solution methods by applying them to a canonical business cycle model of government-good provision in which a …scal authority must determine optimally the provision of government goods, subject to distortionary taxation, a balanced-budget constraint, and while lacking a commitment technology. For this benchmark model we found that all three methods worked well, that the use of generalized Euler equations and value function iteration gave essentially identical results, and that the parameterized shadow price method was the less accurate of the three. We further showed that the value function iteration solution method could easily be extended to accommodate model features such as risk-sensitive preferences and certain forms of occasionally binding constraints, such as bounds on government spending or the tax rate.
Although our application focused on …scal policy, many economic decision problems can be tackled using the solution procedures described in this paper. In particular, problems relating to monetary policy design, both with and without a zero-bound on nominal interest rates, monetary and …scal policy coordination, exchange rate management, and international lending. These solution procedures can also be used to examine the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on allocations and asset prices in economies where policymakers cannot commit.
